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maintained, are in fact and in law private property; having all the
incidents of property of that nature. I am also of the opinion, that
the several acts of Assembly, passed concurrently by the Legislatures of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, for the protection of the
owners of the said fisheries against ifiterruption or injury, by persons
claiming a common right of fishing in the said river, are constitutional and in all respects valid.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States for the Wisconsin
District.
ENOCH W. CLARKE AND OTHERS VS. THE CITY OF JANESVILLE.
1. Coupons or interest warrants attached to bonds of a city, issued to a railroad
company, for stock, by the city subscribed for, in pursuance of a local law, are
not original obligations or promises to pay the bearer, and have no legal validity
independently of the bond.
2. The assignee of such bonds cannot maintain a suit in his own name, there being
no law in the State authorizing it.
3. Such bonds do not, by 4ssignment to bearer, assume the character of negotiable
paper, for the purpose of suit by the bearer.
4. The federal courts are excluded from jurisdiction of suits upon such bonds,
issued to a corporation or citizen of the same State of the obligor, by Sect. 11 of
the Act of Congress to establish the judicial courts of the United States. 1 Statutes at Large, 73.

The issue joined in this cause came on to be tried. The declaration was in assumpsit upon the common counts; to which the general issue was pleaded. In support of the issue on the part of the
plaintiffs, were offered in evidence several bonds of the city of
Janesville, to the Rock River Valley Union Railroad Company,
with coupons or interest warrants annexed. The bonds were issued
in the year 1853, for one thousand dollars each, payable in twenty
years, with interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, at the city of New York. They were signed by

CLARKE ET AL. vs. THE CITY OF JANESYILLE.

the mayor of the city, with the seal of the city annexed, and were
countersigned by the Treasurer of the city. They are payable to
the said railroad company or assigns; and on the day of their
date, they purport to have been assigned by the President of said
company to
or bearer. Printed on the same sheet
of paper, with each bond, are forty coupons or interest warrants,
each for forty dollars, for a semi-annual interest, according to the
condition of the bond. These coupons are signed by the Treasurer
of the city, and are made payable to the bearer; in regular succession of every six months, for twenty years. This suit is to recover
the interest that had accrued on the bonds since their date; and it
is in assumpsit upon the coupons for such interest.
To this evidence the defendant's counsel objected, for several
reasons; of which the following are here noticed:
1. These coupons or interest warrants have no legal validity
independently of the bonds, to which they are annexed, and they
pass to the assignee of said bonds.
2. There is no law in this State, empowering an assignee of a
bond or specialty to maintain a suit in his own name.
3. This court has no jurisdiction of this cause; the jurisdiction
being excluded by sect. 11 of the act of Congress to establish the
judicial courts of the United States, approved September 24th,
1789. 1 Statutes at Large, 73.
These bonds were issued in pursuance of an act of the Legislature of Wisconsin, entitled "An Act to Incorporate the city of
Janesville, approved March 19th, 1853. By sect. 7 of said act,
"the Common Council shall have power to submit to the legal
voters, the question, whether said city shall take stock in any railroad running to, or passing through said city. And if a majority
of the votes cast on any such question be in favor of taking stock,
then the Common Council shall, by resolution to be entered on the
city records, authorize the mayor to subscribe for the city the
amount of stock voted to be taken." And by sect. 9, "the Common Council shall have power to issue the bonds of the city, with
coupons or interest warrants attached, drawing not more than ten
per cent. interest, to pay the stock so subscribed, and shall have
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power to levy a special tax on the taxable property in said city, to
pay the interest on such bonds, and also the principal, when the
same becomes due. But the Common Council shall not have power
to dispose of such bonds for less than the face thereof."
The Rock River Valley Union Railroad Company, and the city
of Janesville, are corporations created by the laws of Wisconsin;
and they are located and doing business in said State.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The clause of the eleventh section of the Judiciary
Act, in regard to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, is this:
"Nor shall any District or Circuit Court have cognizance of any
suit to recover the contents of a promissory note or chose in action,
in favor of any assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted
in such court to recover the said contents, if no assignment had
been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." This
section is restrictive of the jurisdiction contemplated by the third
article of the Constitution of the United States, which provides,
that the judicial power shall extend to controversies between citizens of different States. The Constitution has defined the limits of
the judicial power of the United States, but has not prescribed: how
much of it shall be exercised by the Circuit or District Courts.
These courts were created by statute, in pursuance of the Constitution, and can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers..
Sheldon vs. Sill, 8 Howard, 441. It is well understood, by those
experienced in the jurisprudence of the United States, that Congress has conferred upon the federal courts but a portion of the'
jurisdiction contemplated by the Constitution. This prohibition
was inserted in the law, for the purpose of relieving the federal.
courts, as much as possible, from enforcing local contracts; and also
of preventing assignments of choses in action to. non-residents, for
the purpose of rendering a defence upon the merits or a set-off less
available to defendants.
suit might be sustained in this court, by the plaintiffs against
the defendant, to recover possession of these bonds in specie, or
damages for their wrongful caption or detention; for this law has
88
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no application to such a suit by the assignee of a chose in actidn,
but only to a suit or action to recover the contents. Deshler vs.
.Dodge, 16 Howard, 622. So in Smith vs. Kernochen, 7 Id. 198,
an assignee of a mortgage between parties of the sa'me State, maintained ejectment against the mortgagor to recover possession of the
mortgaged premises.
In Sheldon vs. Sill, 8 Howard, 441, it is decided that a bond
for a debt with a mortgage to secure it, is a chose in action ; and
that the assignee of a mortgage between citizens of the same State
cannot maintain a bill in chancery to foreclose, when the mortgagee cannot, because it is a suit to recover the contents of a chose in
action. Nor have the federal courts cognizance of a suit to recover
the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action, in
favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in
such courts to recover the said contents, if no assignment had been
made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange. Gibson vs.
Chew, 16 Peters, 315; -Dromgoole vs. Tk Barmers and Mechanics Bank, 2 Howard, 241. In these and many other cases,
this restrictive clause has been liberally construed.
It is contended, that these bonds were intended for negotiation,
as promissory notes, and that they were so put in circulation by the
assignment. In pursuance of the act of incorporation of the city of
Janesville, these bonds were given to the railroad company in payment of stock in said company, subscribed for by the city. The
law did not require the railroad company to accept these bonds in
payment of the stock; nor did it authorize them to be given to any
particular person or corporation, or to be put in circulation as negotiable paper. The bonds might either be given to any person or
corporation, who would furnish their amount at par, as a loan to the
city or to the railroad company in payment of the stock. The act
,prohibited the Common Council from disposing of them for less
kthan their face ; thereby placing the city of Janesville, as a stock.holder, by means of these bonds on an equality with the other stockwho paid in cash. And whether the assignment of the
-holders
bonds is equitable or legal, the effect thereof as to the assignee, in
regard of the jurisdiction of the court, is the same. See the opinion
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of MIarshall, Chief Justice, in Sere vs. Pitot, 6 Cranch, 332.

The

assignment of these bonds is not to the plaintiffs by name, but to
or bearer, leaving the space for their or any other names to
be inserted. This may be proper in a financial point of view, to
save the necessity of a formal assignment at each transfer. But
these bonds are made to the railroad company or its assigns; and
an assignment is necessary to pass them. The railroad company,
being a corporation created by the laws of this State, and located
and doing business therein, cannot maintain a suit upon these bonds
to recover their contents or the interest accrued on them, either in
its own name or in that of an assignee.
When the plaintiff has a legal right to sue, the court will not inquire into the residence of those who may have an equitable interest
in the demand, as in Bonnafee vs. Williams, 3 Howard, 574, where
it is decided that the court has jurisdiction where a note is made by
a citizen of one State, and payable to another citizen of the same
State or bearer, alid the party bringing the suit is a citizen of a
different State, although upon the face of the note it was expressed
to be for the use of persons residing in the State, in which the
maker and payee lived. But in its inception, a bond should be
made payable to some certain obligee, and cannot be made payable
like a note or bill. to bearer. Ann. Dig. for 1851, page 79, see. 63.
And the legal right to recover on a bond is in the obligee. _rish vs.
Johnston, 1 Jone's' Rep. 483. These bonds are under the seal of
the corporation of the city, and are specialties, and are not negotiable as bills of exchange and promissory notes, either by the law
merchant or by statute. All interest in them, either legal or equitable, must pass from the obligee by assignment or endorsement.
By the assignment of these bonds, the plaintiffs may have acquired
an interest in them sufficient to control them, and to receive their
contents, but they cannot sue in their own names. There is no
statute authority in this State for the assignment or transfer of a
bond or specialty, whereby the assignee or holder may become the
legal owner, and be enabled to sue in his own name. The law authorizing the execution and delivery of these bonds, and the consideratqon expressed show the railroad company to be the legal obligee,
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which can be the only plaintiff in a suit upon them, either for principal or interest, in the absence of a law enabling an assignee to
become a legal party. In the case of ITrvine vs. Lowry, 14
Peters, 293, the note in suit was made by Lowry, payable to
Irvine or order, in the notes of the Lumbermen's Bank, and
was endorsed to the bank. The Supreme Court in the opinion say,
"1The paper is not negotiable by the usage or custom of merchants.
The promise is not to pay any certain sum of money, but the
amount in the notes of the Lumbermen's Bank. It is not a
promissory note either by the law merchant or by the statute, and
not being under seal, it is not assignable by the Act of Assembly
of Pennsylvania on that subject relating to bonds. -The bank,
therefore, cannot sue in its own name, by virtue of the endorsement of Irvine ; nor could they sue if it was a specialty endorsed
to them, because the legal right of action would still remain in
Irvine, though the equitable interest in the thing promised may
have passed to the bank." So it is in this case, in the absence of
a statute providing for an assignment of bonds, and for the assignee
maintaining suit in his own name. The legal right of action remains in the Railroad Company, the obligee, though the equitable
interest in the contents of the bonds may have passed to the plaintiffs.
It may be said, that, although these. obligations have been issued
by a corporation having a seal, and which is thereto annexed, they
should be considered as negotiable choses in action. But it is now
well understood, that corporations can issue promises in writing to
pay money, and can contract debts without the use of their seal.
The coupons call these papers certificates; but the law, authorizing
the counsel to issue them, terms them bonds, and on their face they
have the form of bonds. But let them be technically bonds or not,
they can only be transferred by assignment.
This suit is in assumpsit upon those coupons, which specify the
semi-annual interest payable before the date of the summons. The
plaintiffs have proceeded upon them as promissory notes or negotiable paper, payable to bearer; and they contend that the law re-
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strictive of our jurisdiction is not applicable to them. It is well
settled, that this provision of law does not extend to notes payable
to bearer; upon the groufid, that the original promise is to pay
any person, who may happen to be the bearer; and that as the
interest in such a note passes by mere manual delivery, the holder
cannot, therefore, be said to claim by virtue of an assignment, and
is not affected by the disabilities of the nominal payee. Bullard
vs. Bell, 1 Mason, 251; The Bank of Kentucky vs. Wistar, 2
Peters, 318. But is the original promise or obligation of the city
of Janesville in these coupons ? The charter of the city authorized
the Common Council to issue bonds, with coupons or interest warrants annexed. In pursuance of that law, and a resolution of the
Common Council, bonds were executed by the Mayor as the head
and president of the Council and corporation, under the corporate
seal, for one thousand dollars each, payable in twenty years, with
interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, payable semiannually at the city of New York, with forty coupons or interest
warrants attached to each bond, representing the interest condition
of the bond.
The bonds are signed by the mayor and countersigned by the
treasurer of the city. The coupons or interest warrants are signed
by the treasurer alone; and they do not purport to be obligations
of the city through the Common Council, but have a direct reference to the bond to which it is attached. There is no question,
that by the face of the bonds, in connection with the coupons, the
interest is recoverable semi-annually, as it becomes payable. The
coupons are appendages to the bonds for convenience in receipting
for interest paid, and also as evidence to the purchaser of the bonds
of the non-payment of any previous interest; and they pass by
assignment of the bond to which they are, attached. They had no
legal force or validity at their inception, independently of the
bonds ; and it is upon the bonds alone that the interest is recoverable. They draw the attention of the court directly to the bond,
to which they are attached, as the original contract. The bonds
are special contracts of a city, in pursuance of a local law., for a
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local and specified purpose, which the court must disregard in pronouncing the coupons negotiable paper, payable to anybody, and
recoverable by the holder.
For these reasons, the evidence is rejected and the suit dismissed.
Mr. Brown, for the plaintiff.
Mr. Noggle, for the defendant.

In the Supreme Court of California.
EX PARTE FRANK KNOWLES.
1. The power to naturalize is made a judicial power by the Act of Congress.
2. Congress cannot confer any judicial power upon a State court.
S. The provision of the Constitution of the United States, which gives Congress the
power to establish "An uniform rule of naturalization," is construed to meanthat the rule when established shall be executed by the States.
4. The Legislature of California has, by express enactment, conferred jurisdiction
on the District Courts of the State to grant naturalization, according to the rules
established by Congress.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HEYDENFELDT, J.-This is an application on the part of an alien
to become naturalized under the provisions of the Constitution and
laws of the United States. It has been made directly to this court,
and has been resisted by several eminent members of the bar, in
the character of amici eurite, on the ground that State courts have
no jurisdiction of the subject matter.
It might be a sufficient answer to the applicant to declare what is
the settled decision of this court,-that it is, under the State Constitution, an appellate tribunal, and can take no original jurisdiction,
h6wever conferred.
But the importance of the question which has been argued at the
bar, and. the learning and research which have been evinced in
its examination, induce us, in departure from our usual habit, to
consider and determine the proper construction which should be
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given to the Constitution and laws of the United States, in respect
to the question of naturalization. Two propositions which have been
made by the counsel opposed to the applicant, will first be disposed
of. These are: First-That the power to naturalize by virtue of
the Act of Congress of 1802, is a judicial one; and Second-That
Congress has no power to confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a
State. Upon both of these propositions we affirmatively concur.
It is a judicial power: because upon evidence a conclusion has to be
attained, resulting from the exercise of the judgment of the court.
This is simple and clear enough, without resorting to authority.
But nevertheless, we will refer to the case of Spratt vs. Spratt,
4 Peters, 406, where it is distinctly so settled by Chief Justice
Mlarshall.
Congress has no power to confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a
State: because, First, the Constitution gives it no such power; and
Secondly, the Constitution expressly, declares that "the judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." (See Sec. 1, Art. 3, Const. United States.)
The Constitution having thus fixed where the judicial power shall
be vested, it cannot be vested elsewhere.
There have been various adjudications maintaining this view,
which it will be sufficient simply to cite. (See Martin vs. Hunter's
Zessee, 1 Wheaton, 304 ; The State of .Marylandvs. Thomas Butler,
reportel in 12 Niles' Register, p. 115 ; United States vs. Lathropv,
17 Johnson R., 4,261; State vs. McBride, 1 Rice R., 400.)
It was urged in the course of the argument, and some authorities
were cited, to the effect, that although Congress could not confer
jurisdiction on a State court so as to compel its exercise, yet it
would be legitimate if the court was willing to accept it. This is to
me a solecism. A court is a creature of the constitution and laws
under which it exists. To exercise any power not derived fr'om
such constitution and laws, would necessarily be a usurpation. It
sounds curious to say, "Congress has no authority to give this
power to the court, yet the court exercises this power by virtue of
the authority of Congress."
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I come now to the consideration of the main question, whether
the State courts of California, and what State courts, have the
power to naturalize; and I have come to the conclusion that this
question is but little affected by the propositions which I have already
been led to consider, on account of the seeming importance attached
to them by the learned counsel, and the able manner in which they
were presented.
In the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, enumerating the powers of Congress, is the following separate clause
"To establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States." By
metaphysical refinement, in examining the form of our government,
it might be correctly said that there is no such thing as a citizen of
of the United States. But constant usage-arising from convenience, and perhaps necessity, and dating from the formation of the
Confederacy-has given substantial existence to the idea which the
term conveys. A citizen of any one of the States of the Union, is
held to be, and called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive.a citizen
of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the States,
is totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of the expression as used in
the Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other
provisions. The object then to be attained, by the exercise of the
power of naturalization, was to make citizens of the respective
States.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the States had
power to make citizens of aliens. Does the clause of the Constitution above quoted deprive them of it ?
The true rule of construction as to the exclusiveness of the power
of Congress is, First-Thatit must be granted exclusively ;. Second
forbidden to the States; Third-from the nature of the power, its
exercise by both must be incompatible and incongruous. Does the
power under review come within either of these positions ? If we
examine the language closely, and according to the rules of rigid
construction always applicable to delegated powers, we will find that
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the power to naturalize, in fact is not given to Congress, but simply
the power to establish an uniform rule. The States are not forbidden to naturalize, nor is there anything in the exercise of the
power by them, incongruous or incompatible with the power of Congress to establish an uniform rule. That the States, if they choose
to exercise the power as an original one, must abide by the rule
which Congress makes, there cannot be the slightest difference of
opinion. The power given to Congress was, according to my apprehension, intended to provide a rule for the action of the States, and
not a rule for the action of the federal government. Else why was
the term "uniform" made to qualify "rule ?" If it was designed
simply to give the power of making citizens, to Congress, simpler
mbdes of expression might have been used, and ought to have been
required, and surely there would have been no use for the term
"uniform,"
Why should the rule be uniform, unless more than one
had to execute the rule ? It certainly could not have been imagined
that Congress would have made a rule for its own action, or the
action of its own officers, which could have operated without
uniformity.
The States had the power to naturalize foreigners, and there was
no necessity for this power to be surrendered to the general government. But by anpther clause of the Constitution, (See. 1, Art. 4,)
it was determined that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
It might well have been apprehended, that in the feeble and sparselypopulated condition of the States, a race would have been run for
the acquisition of population, differing in its radicalism only according to the difference of opinion as to the danger of the sudden introduction of too large a foreign element; and as, when once admitted
to citizenship in one State, the alien would have all privileges in
the other States, it would be in effect allowing one State to modify
or break down the policy of another. This is made apparent by
the discussions which then took place upon the subject. Hence the
necessity arose, not that Congress should have power to naturalize,
but should have power to prescribe to the States a rule to be carried
out by them, and which should be uniform in each. If this were
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not so, it follows conclusively, that there is no mode by which a
foreigner can be made expressly a citizen of a State; for I have
already shown there is no such thing, technically, as a citizen of the
United States. Consequently, one who is created a citizen of the
United States, is certainly not made a citizen of any particular
State. It follows, that as it is only the citizens of the State who
are entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States, if the process is left alone to the action of Congress, through
her federal tribunals, and in the form which they have adopted
them, a distinction both in name and privileges is made to
exist between citizens of the United States ex vi termini, and citizens of the respective States. To the former no privileges or immunities are granted; and it will hardly be contended, that politica1
status can be derived by implication against express legal enactments. I cannot concede that such a result was ever contemplated,
and yet it would be inevitable upon any other hypothesis, than that
the "uniform rule," declared by the Constitution, was intended to
be prescribed for the action of the States, and that by this rule they
were left to exercise, or not, their original power of naturalization.
The next inquiry which is in proper order is, whether the State
of California has determined, by her legislation, to admit foreigners
to the rights of citizenship, under the uniform rule established by
the various acts of Congress.
This question, in my opinion, is settled in the affirmative by an
Act passed May 18, 1853, entitled "An _ct to define the fees to
be charged by the clerks of courts for the naturalization of foreigners." This Act, after providing the amount of fees to be
allowed the clerks in the process of making citizens, declares: "And
said papers herein provided for shall be issued by the court upon
application of any individual entitled to receive them, and upon his
complying with the provisions of the naturalization laws."
Much criticism might be indulged upon the form of this law; and
upon the fact that its caption shows that it was intended only as a
fee bill. But it must be conceded that in the construction of laws,
the principal consideration is the intention of the law-maker. Governed by this rule, I have no hesitation in saying that the act in
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question is equivalent to a direct and palpable declaration by the
legislature which enacted it, that it recognized the rule of naturalization prescribed for the States by Congress, and determined that
the courts of this State, of competent jurisdiction, should be vested
with the power of carrying it out.
If this were not so, there was no reason whatever for passing the
act, and courts cannot decide an act to be inoperative where a
substantial meaning and design can be drawn from its expressions.
In this act, the courts are vested with jurisdiction : for they are
required to issue the certificates of naturalization and to determine
that the individual is entitled to receive them. The laws of Congress (the uniform rule) are recognized as the rule of action; for
the term "naturalization laws" applies to none other, and their
provisions are required, expressly, to be complied with.
What, however, are the courts of competent jurisdiction? To
;answer this, we must turn to the Act of Congress of 1802, and be
"governed by the rule there established. Congress having power
under the Constitution to make the rule, certainly had the right to
make the exercise of it a judicial power, and fix upon the class of
courts which might be invested with the jurisdiction. This it could
-do as a part of the rule, although it might not directly confer the
jurisdiction. -By the third section of the Act of 1802, it is enacted
":that every court of record in any individual State, having common
law jurisdiction and a seal, and clerk or prothonotary, shall be considered as a District Court within the meaning of this Act."
We have already determined that this court has not the jurisdiction: because its powers are, exclusively, appellate. The District
Courts of this State are courts of original and common law jurisdiction; are courts of record; and have a seal and clerk, and consequently come fully within the description of the rule laid down by
the act of 1802; and, therefore, under the act of this State of
1853, are fully invested with power and jurisdiction to naturalize
foreigners who exhibit the qualifications fixed by the laws of the
United States. The other courts of this State are inferior and of
limited powers. They are made courts of record by our statutes,
but they have only statute and not common law jurisdiction; and,
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therefore, not coming within the class enumerated by the act of
Congress, have no power to grant naturalization, and any attempt
of the kind would be necessarily coram non Judice and void.
For the want of jurisdiction in this court the application is
denied.

In the Supreme Court of California.
THE PEOPLE VS. GERKE ET AL.
1. Treaties made by the United States removing the disability of aliens to inherit
are valid and within the intent of the Constitution of the United States.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HEYDENFELDT, J.-By a convention between the United States
and the Kingdom of Prussia, made in the year 1828, the 14th article provides, "And when on the death of any person holding real
estate within the territory of the one party, such real estate would,
by the laws of the land, descend on a citizen or subject of the other,
were he not disqualified by alienage, such citizen or subject shall be
allowed a reasonable time to sell the same and to withdraw the proceeds without molestation."
The attorney-general, in support of the information filed in this
case, denies the power of the federal government to make such a
provision by treaty, and the determination of this case depends upon
the solution of that question. Cases have frequently arisen, where
aliens have claimed to inherit by virtue of treaty provisions analogous to the one under consideration, and in all of them, so far as I
have examined, the stipulations were enforced in favor of the foreign
claimants. See 2 Wheat. 259; 4 Wheat. 453; 8 Wheat. 464;
9 Wheat. 489; 10 Wheat. 181.
But in none of these cases was the question raised as to the power
of the federal government to make the treaty. It has been the
practice of the government from an early period after the ratification of the Constitution, and its power is now, I believe, for the
first time disputed.
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The language, which grants the power to make treaties, contains
no words of limitation; it does not follow that the power is unlimited.
It must be subject to the general rule, that an instrument is to be
construed so as to reconcile and give meaning and effect to all its
parts. If it were otherwise, the most important limitation upon the
powers of the federal government would be ineffectual, and the
reserved rights of the States would be subverted. This principle of
construction as applied, not only in reference to the Constitution of
the United States, but particularly in the relation of all the rest of
it to the treaty making grant, was recognized both by Mr. Jefferson
and John Adams,-two leaders of opposite schools of construction.
See Jefferson's Works, vol. 4, p. 135; and vol. 6, p. 560.
It may, therefore, be assumed that, aside from the limitations and
prohibitions of the Constitution upon the powers of the federal
government, "the power of treaty was given, without restraining
it to particular objects, in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any
sovereign in any other society." This principle, as broadly as I have
deemed proper to lay it down, results from the form and necessities of our government, as elicited by a general view of the federal
compact. Before the compact, the States had the power of treatymaking as potentially as any power on earth-it extended to every
subject whatever. By the compact, they expressly granted it to the federal government in general terms, and prohibited it to themselves.
The general government must, therefore, hold it as fully as the
States held who granted it, with the exceptions which necessarily
flow from a proper construction of the other powers granted, and
those prohibited, by the Constitution. The only -questions then,
which can arise in the consideration of the validity of a treaty, are:
.First,is it a proper subject of treaty according to international law
or the usage and practice of civilized nations ? Second, is it prohibited by any of the limitations in the Constitution?
Taking for illustration the present subject of treaty, no one will
deny that, to the commercial States of the Union, and indeed to
the citizens of any State who are engaged in foreign commerce, a
stipulation to remove the disability of aliens to hold property, is of
paramount importance, or, at any rate, it may be so considered by
the States, and demanded as a part of their commercial polity.
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Now, as by the compact the States are absolutely prohibited from
making treaties: if the general government has not the power,
then we must admit a lameness and incompleteness in our whole
system, which renders us inferior to any other enlightened nation
in the power and ability to advance the prosperity of the people we
govern.
Mr. Calhoun, in his Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, has given to this power a full consideration, and I cannot doubt that the view which I have taken, is sustained by his reasoning. According to his opinion the following
may be classed as the limitations on the treaty making power: First,
it is limited strictly to questions inter alios--"all such clearly
appertain to it." Second, "by all the provisions of the Constitution which inhibit certain acts from being done by the government
or any of its departments." Third, "by such provisions of the
Constitution as direct certain acts to be done in a particular way,
and which prohibit the contrary." Fourth, "1it can enter into no
stipulation calculated to change the character of the government,
or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making
power; or which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of the
government or the objects for which it was formed."
Having stated these as the only limitations, the author adds,
"Within these limits all questions which may arise between us and
other powers, be the subject matter what it may, fall within the
limits of the treaty-making power and may be adjusted by it."
One of the arguments at the bar against the extent of this power
of treaty, is, that it permits the federal government to control the
internal policy of the States, and, in the present case, to alter
materially the statutes of distribution.
If this was so to the full extent claimed, it might be a sufficient
answer to say, that it is one of the results of the compact, and, if
the grant be considered too improvident for the safety of the States,
the evil can be remedied by the constitution-making power. I think,
however, that no such consequence follows as is insisted. The
statutes of distribution are not altered or affected. Alienage is the
subject of the treaty. Its disability results from political reasons
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which arose at an early period of the history of civilization, and
which the enlightened advancement of modern times, and changes
in the political and social condition of nations, have rendered without force or consequence. The disability to succeed to property is
alone removed, the character of the person is made politically to
undergo a change, and then the statute of distribution is left to its
full effect, unaltered and unimpaired in word or sense. If there is
one object more than another which belongs to our political relations
and which ought to be the subject of treaty regulations, it is the extension of this comity which is so highly favored by the liberal
spirit of the age, and so conducive in its tendency to the peace and
amity of nations.
Even if the effect of this power was to abrogate to some extent
the legislation of the States, we have authority for admitting it, if
it does not exceed the limitations which we have cited from the
work of Mr. Calhoun, and laid down as the rule to which we yield
our assent.
During the war of the Revolution, the States had passed acts of
confiscation; acts against the collection of debts due to the subjects
of Great Britain; and acts for the punishment of treason. By the
treaty of peace, the effects of these various acts were provided
against, and as late as 1792, long after the ratification of the Constitution, Mr. Jefferson, in answer to the complaint of the British
Minister, Mr. Hammond, distinctly recognized the doctrine, that
treaties are the supreme law of the laud, and that State legislation
must yield to them; and he therein cites the acts of State legislatures and the decisions of State judges, who all conform to the
same opinion. (See 3 Jefferson's Works, 365.)
I can see no danger which can result from yielding to the federal
government the full extent of powers which it may claim from the
plain language, intent, and meaning of the grant under consideration. Upon some subjects the policy of a State government, as
shown by her legislation, is dependent upon the policy of foreign
governments, and would be readily changed upon the principle of
mutual concession. This can only be effected by the action of that
branch of the State sovereignty known as the general government,
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and when effected, the Statb policy must give way to that adopted
by the governmental agent of her foreign relations.
It results from these views that the treaty of 1828, with Prussia,
is valid, and that aliens, -subjects of Prussia, are protected by its
provisions.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
agree with my associate, that the doctrine has been
settled in the United States courts, in cases relating to analogous
treaties to the one in question, that the courts of the country should
extend to aliens the full protection which the treaty seeks to give
them, in the acquisition or distribution of property.
In C irac vs. Chirae, 2 Wheaton, 259, the treaty with France of
1778, was passed upon, and it was decided by the United States
court, that it secured to the citizens and subjects of either power,
the privilege of holding lands in the territory of the other. This
was re-affirmed in Charnealvs. Banks, 10 Wheaton, 181. A similar
provision in the treaty with Great Britain of 1794 was also sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Euges vs.
Edwards, 9 Wheaton, 489. So far as the authority of the federal
courts is concerned, they appear to have uniformly administered
the law upon the meaning given by construction to the language of
the treaty, seeming never to have in any respect doubted the power
of the general government to provide by treaty with a foreign
power for the mutual protection of the property belonging to the
citizens or subjects of each in the territory of the other. The treatymaking power of the federal government must, from necessity, be
sufficiently ample, so as to cover all of the usual subjects of treaties
between different powers. If we were to deny to the treaty-making
power of our government the exercise of jurisdiction over the property of deceased aliens, upon the ground of interference with the
course of descents, or the laws of distribution of a State where property may exist, by parity of reasoning we should not make commercial treaties with foreign nations; because, it might be said,
some of their provisions would injure the business of a portion of
the citizens of one of the States of the Union.
BRYAN, J.-I
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If the treaty-making power which resides in the federal government is not sufficient to permit it to arrange with a foreign nation
the distribution of an alien's property, then .that power resides
nowhere, (since it is denied to the States,) and we must confess our
system of government so weak and faulty, as to be incapable of
extending to its citizens in foreign lands that protection which is
most common amongst a majority of modern civilized nations.
I agree with my associate in the conclusion, that the treaty-making
power of the federal government was sufficient to enable it to insert
the article in the treaty with Prussia, which has before been quoted;
and that the alien heirs of Deeck are protected by its provisions,
and are entitled to the withdrawal of the proceeds of the estate.
I therefore concur in th6 reversal of the judgment.

In the Suvreme Court of Ohio, -December Term, 1854.
JOHN M. BASHFORD vs. ANDREW J. SHAW.
1. In case of guaranty, demand of payment of the principal debtor, and notice of
his default, are requisite to charge the guarantor, only, where the fact on which
his liability is made dependent rests peculiarly within the knowledge of the guarantee, or depends on his option.
2. But where the contingency which determines the liability of a guarantor, is one
which is known to him, or which he is bound to know, or where each party has,
in legal contemplation, equal means of information, the guarantor must take
notice at his peril.
3. In order to discharge a guarantor from liability, on the ground of want of notice
of the default of the principal debtor, there must be, not only a want of the notice
within a reasonable time, but there must be also some actual loss or damagethereby caused to the guarantor. And if suchloss or damage does not go to the whole
amount of the claim, but is only in part, the guarantor is not wholly discharged,
but only pro tanto.
4. If the principal debtor be solvent when the note falls due, and due notice of the
default be not given, and the principal afterwards, and before notice, becomes
insolvent, the guarantor is discharged.
5. The continued insolvency of the principal debtor from the time of the maturity
of the debt, as a general thing, dispenses with the necessity of the notice, in order
to charge the guarantor.
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6. Where the undertaking of the party is to guaranty the payment of the note of
another, after final process, the prosecution of the claim to final process against
the maker of the note is essential, in order to charge the guarantor.
7. But an omission to bring suit against the original debtor, within a reasonable
time, will not discharge the guarantor from liability, where the terms of the
guaranty do not describe the degree of diligence to be used in the proceeding, by
suit, and where, in consequence of the continued insolvency of the principal
debtor from the time of the maturity of the debt, the guarantor suffered no loss
by the delay.

Petition in error, to reverse the judgment of the Common Pleas
of Morrow County.
The original action was brought by the plaintiff in error, on the
15th of January, 1853, on the defendant's guaranty of the payment
of a promissory note, before George D. Cross, Esq., a justice of the
peace, who, upon the trial of the cause, rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. In the Common Pleas,
the plaintiff declared in assumpsit on the following instrument, to
wit :
"IJERIA, July 28th, 1849.
"On or before the fifth day of March, I promise to pay A. J. Shaw, or bearer,
the sum of thirty-five dollars, for value received.

(Signed)

"JOHN BOXER."

Endorsed as follows:
"December 8th, 1849.
process.

I guarantee the payment of the within note, after final
(Signed)

"A. J. SHAW."

The defendant plead non-assumpsit. At the September term of
the Common Pleas, 1853, the parties waived the intervention of a
jury, and submitted the cause to the court, upon the instrument
declared on, and an agreed statement of the facts, as follows, to
wit :
"1It is agreed in this case, that the defendant, in consideration
that the plaintiff had sold him a horse, on the 8th of December,
1849, made the endorsement appearing on the said promissory
note; that the note became due on the 5th day of March, 1850.
On the 13th day of January, 1851, Bashford commenced suit on
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the note against Boner, the maker of the note, before William
Shunk, a justice of the peace, and on the 25th of January, 1851,
recovered a judgment. And it is further agreed, that at no time
after the note became due, could any part of the same have been
collected from said Boner, on account of insolvency; and that execution had been issued on the said judgment against him, January
25th, 1851, and returned February 20th, 1851, 'No goods or chattels found whereon to levy." And that the present action on the
guaranty was commenced on the 15th of January, 1858."
Upon this state of the case, the Common Pleas found for the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, but the court overruled the motion and rendered judgment for the defendant; whereupon the plaintiff duly excepted to the decision of the court.
Stinchcomb & Brumback, for plaintiff.
-Dunn& Gurley, for defendant.
J.-The undertaking of the defendant declared on, in
the original action in the court below, constituted a guaranty of
the payment of Boner's note, after proceedings for the collection of
the same had been prosecuted to final process. And the questions
which arise for determination are the following:
First, whether the plaintiff's right of recovery in the court below,
could be defeated by want of evidence of notice to the defendant of
the default of the maker of the note; and if not,
Second, whether it was defeated by the delay which occurred in
the prosecution of the claim to final process.
Of these, in their order.
1. The rule in regard to demand of payment and notice of the
default, required to charge endorsers of negotiable paper, is not
applicable to guarantees. In the former, the demand and notice
is, by an arbitrary rule of the law merchant, strictly required, as a
condition precedent to liability; while in the latter, the demand and
notice of the default of the principal, is a simple duty required of
the holder, with a view of saving the guarantor from actual loss,
which may arise from want of convenient and certain means of
knowledge. There are several classes of guaranties, in which
BARTLEY,
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demand and notice are not required at all. For instance, where
a guaranty is in the nature of a simple security, undertaken originally, and with the principal, that a debt shall be paid, or some other
act be done, the liability attaches without demand of payment and
notice of the default. Chapin vs. Lapham, 20 Pick. Rep. 467.
So, where the undertaking is an absolute and independent stipulation to pay the debt of another at all events, no demand and notice
is said to be necessary. And in the case of Bush vs. Critchfield,
4 Ohio Rep. 103, it was held, by the Supreme Court of this State,
that where the guarantors had covenanted that their principal
should sell and account for all merchandise placed in his hands by
the plaintiff, within a stated period, no notice of the non-performance
by the principal was necessary. To the same effect is the case of
Douglassvs. Howland, 24 Wend. Rep. 35 ; also, Hammond vs. Gilmore's Adm'r, 14 Conn. Rep. 479.
Demand and notice, however, are requisite to charge a guarantor,
where the fact on which his liability is made dependent rests peculiarly within the knowledge of the guarantee, or depends on his
option. But where the fact which determines the liability, is one
which the guarantor knows, or is bound to know, or which is equally
within the power of both parties to ascertain; in other words, where
each party has, in legal contemplation, equal means of information,
the guarantor must take notice at his peril. -Farwellvs. Smith,
12 Pick. 83 and 87 ; Davis vs. Duvall, 4 Wash. 0. 0. Rep. 181 ;
also, W!yse vs. Wakefield, in the Court of Exchequer, 6 Meeson &
W. 442. The application of the rule requiring demand and notice,
founded on the reasons above mentioned, is cleared of all difficulty,
in case of the guaranty of the goodness or collectability of a
debt. The contingency upon which the liability is made dependent,
rests upon the action of the guarantee, and depends on his option.
The result of his efforts to enforce the liability of the principal, and
the period of ,their termination, are of necessity peculiarly within
his knowledge. He is therefore, reasonably and properly, required
to give notice to the guarantor of the default of the principal,
before bringing the suit upon the guaranty. Grier vs. Ricks,
3 Devereaux, 62; Adoock vs. Fleming, 2 Dev. & Bat. 225 ; Lewis
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vs. Bradley, 2 Iredell, 303; and Sylvester vs. Downing, 18 Vermont Rep. 32.
In the cause before us, the engagement of the defendant was the
guaranty of payment after final process. This required the plaintiff
to prosecute the original liability to final process; and the fact upon
which the contingency of the defendant's lia-bilitywas made to depend,
consisted in non-payment after the requisite remedy for the collection of the claim had been used. And this, depending upon the
action of the plaintiff, left the default, after the termination of the
efforts for collection, peculiarly within his knowledge ; so that notice
to the defendant of the default, would have been essential, before
his liability could have been enforced, had it not been dispensed
with, by the circumstance hereafter noticed, which took the case out
of the operation of the rule.
The ground, however, upon which notice of the default of the
principal is required, in case of guaranty, clearly distinguishes it
from the notice required to charge an endorser, in the ordinary case
of the end6rsement of commercial paper. The latter is entitled to
strict notice, without delay, and without regard to consequences.
But in case of guaranty, notice of the default is sufficient, if it be
given in a reasonable time. In the cases of Wild vs. Savage, 1
Story's Rep. 22; and Howe vs. tickels, 22 Maine Rep. 175, the
adjudications on this subject are very fully reviewed, and the doctrine shown to be well settled, that in order to discharge a guarantor
from liability on the ground of want of notice, there must be, not
only a want of notice of default, within a reasonable time, but there
must be also some actual loss or damage thereby sustained by the
guarantor; and if the loss or damage does not go to the whole
amount of the claim, but is only in part, that the guarantor is not
wholly discharged, but only pro tanto, or, according to the extent
of the loss. If the principal be solvent when the note falls due,
and the requisite notice be not given to the guarantor, and the
principal afterwards, and before notice, becomes insolvent, the
guarantor is discharged. But where the notice could have afforded
no benefit to the guarantor, and he has suffered no actual loss by
want of it, he is not discharged by the omission to give it. Where,
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therefore, the principal is insolvent when the debt becomes due, or
where the duty is first imposed on the guarantee to require payment, and continued insolvent, notice to the guarantor being unnecessary, is dispensed with; and it is said that, in such case, even a
demand upon the debtor is not ordinarily required. This doctrine
seems to be fully sustained by the leading authorities in England.
ITarringtonvs. .urbor, 8 East, 242 ; Phillipsvs. Astling, 2 Taunt.,
206; Holbrow vs. Wilkins, 1 Barn. & Cress. 10; and Van Wart
vs. Wooley, 3 Barn. & Cress. 439. In the last case, Lord Tenterden said, "1that in cases of guaranty, the nature of the transaction,
and the circumstances of the particular case, were to be considered
and regarded; and that, where the debtor had become bankrupt, a
demand on him was unnecessary to charge the guarantor." And
these cases are full to the effect, that where it does not appear that
the guarantor has sustained any damage or loss, either from the
want of due presentmett to the debtor for payment, or from the
want of due notice of the default, the guarantor is not discharged.
The same doctrine is pointedly asserted in the case of the Oxford
Bank vs. Rayes, 8 Pick. 423; and recognized in G-ibbs vs. Cannor,
9 Serg. & Rawle, 202. And the case of Beynolds vs. Douglass, 12
Peters, 497, decided in the Supreme Court of the United States, is
a: leading case, to the effect that the guarantor is bound without
notice, where the principal is insolvent at the time when the debt
becomes due; and that this liability continues, unless the guarantor
can show that he has sustained some actual prejudice by the want
of due notice of the default of the debtor; and that, if any actual
loss has been sustained, he will be discharged only to the amount of
the damage sustained. This was to the full extent affirmed in the
case of Rkett vs. Poe, 2 Howard's Rep. 484.
The application of this doctrine, therefore, which appears to be
founded in reason and well settled by authority, to the cause under
consideration, removes all difficulty in the determination of the
first point. It is shown, by the agreed statement of facts in the
case, that the principal debtor (Boner) was wholly insolvent when
the note fell due, and ever afterwards remained so. Notice of his
default, therefore, became unnecessary, and was dispensed with;
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and the want of such notice constituted no ground of defence in the
court helow.
2. Did the delay, which occurred in the prosecution of the claim
against the original debtor, interpose any bar to the plaintiff's
recovery? The note became due on the 5th of March, 1850, but
suit was not commenced on it till the 13th day of January, 1851 ;
being the lapse of a little over ten months after the maturity of the
debt. Judgment, however, was taken against him on the 25th day
day of January, 1851; and, on the same day, execution was issued
on the judgment, which, on the 20th day of February, 1851, was
returned, "No goods or chattels found whereon to levy." The
debt, therefore, remained unpaid after final process; so that the
contingency occurred against which the guarantor stipulated. But,
it is claimed that the suit was not prosecuted against Boner in due
.time, and that, upon this ground, the defendant was discharged
from his liability.
It was incumbent on the plaintiff to prosecute the claim against
the principal debtor to final process. The terms of the guaranty
required this. The stipulation of the defendant was to insure the
payment after final process. Nothing could dispense with this
proceeding against the principal; for it was essential to produce
the event by which, alone, the liability of the defendant could be
fixed. But there is nothing in the terms of the guaranty expressly
-ixing or prescribing the degree of diligence to be used, or the
time within which the proceeding should be instituted. Where, by
the terms of a contract, however, an act is required to be done, but
the time for doing it is not expressly prescribed, the law, by implication, requires that it shall be done within a reasonabletime.
It is sometimes the case, that the terms of a guaranty fix the
degree of diligence to be used, or the time and manner in which
the proceedings shall be prosecuted against the principal; and
where this is the case, it has been held, that the terms of the
guaranty must, in this respect, be strictly pursued, otherwise the
liability of the guarantor will be discharged. Such appears to be the
effect of the case of -Dwightvs. Williams, 4 McLean's Rep. 582;
also, WVhite vs. Case, 13 Wend. Rep. 548; and Eddy vs. Stanton,
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21 Wend. Rep. 255. In the last case, the court say, in their reasoning, that although the principal debtor may be said to be insolvent, yet it is impossible to anticipate the fruits which may arise
from the due prosecution of the claim. Property may be discovered,
or some friend come forward and satisfy the debt, etc. But in these
and other cases referred to, the attention of the court appears to
have been directed to the question, whether the legal remedies could,
for any cause, be dispensed with, rather than the time within which
they should be prosecuted.
But the case before us is clearly distinguishable from the cases
referred to. The defendant, in the agreed statement of facts,
admitted that, at no time after the note became due, could any
part of it have been collectedfrom the principaldebtor. The stipulation in the guaranty was, to warrant payment after final process.
The reasonable time implied for the pursuit of the legal remedy,
had relation to all the circumstances surrounding the case. The
object in requiring diligence in the proceeding against the principal,
was safety to the guarantor. And, inasmuch as it was apparent,
when the note became due, that nothing could be collected from
Boner, a delay of a few months in comiliencing suit against him,
operated beneficially'to the guarantor, as it was indulgence to him,
and afforded time to the principal debtor to accumulate means.
There is, certainly, 'no sensible and substantial reason why this
delay should operate to discharge the guarantor. This is not a
case requiring the application of the strict and arbitrary rules of
the mercantile law, sometimes so essential to secure promptness and
vigilance, with a view to certainty and confidence in commercial
transactions. And the defendant cannot claim for himself the
observance of that strictness sometimes allowed in favor of sureties;
for his engagement does not stand upon the consideration of the
original debt, but is founded on an independent consideration, for
his own benefit. Had the defendant specially stipulated in the
contract for diligence, on the part of the plaintiff, in commencing
suit against the maker of the note, or had he specially directed it
to be done, he might, with some reason, insist on the non-compliance
by the plaintiff, as a ground for his discharge. Or had the defendant
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suffered loss, by the delay in the proceeding against the maker of
the note, he would certainly be entitled to a discharge from his
liability, so far, at least, as he had been damnified. But since he
has been in nowise whatsoever prejudiced by the delay, there exists
no just and substantial reason for his discharge from his liability on
this ground.
We are of opinion, therefore, that there is error in the proceedings of the court below.
Judgment of the Common Pleas reversed, and the cause remanded
for further proceedings.

In the District Court of the United States, Southern District of
Ohio,-April Term, 1856.
EX PARTE ROBINSON, MARSHAL OF SAID DISTRICT,-HABEAS CORPUS.
1. The 7th section of the act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1833, authorizes any
judge of the United States to issue the writ of habeas corpus where an officer of
the United States is imprisoned "for any act done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States."
2. It is the proper remedy where a marshal is imprisoned by the sentence of a State
judge as for a contempt in not producing the bodies of cert~in persons named in
a writ of habeas corpus issued by such judge, and if it appears from the evidence
that such perons were legally in the custody of the marshal pursuant to the provisions of the Fugitive Slave act, and that his refusal to produce them before the
State judge was a paramount duty by the terms of the said act, the marshal is
entitled to his discharge under the said 7th section of the act of 1833.
3. In ordering his discharge upon a habeas, a judge of the United States does not
assume a jurisdiction to review or reverse the sentence or judgment of the State
judge, but merely exercises a power expressly conferred by an act of Congress.
4. Although the authorities are not uniform as to the right of a State judge to issue
the writ of habeas corpus, where the imprisonment is under the authority ofea law
of the United States, it is well settled, that when the fact is proved that the imprisonment is under such authority, the jurisdiction of the State judge is at an
end, and all subsequent proceedings are coaram non judice.

Messrs. Ketchum and ffeadington, for the marshal.
Messrs. Cox and Jolliffe, in opposition to the discharge.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEAVITT, J.-The facts which it is material to notice in the decision of the question before me are, that on the 28th of January
last, one Gaines, a citizen of Kentucky, on his affidavit that certain
colored persons, owing him service in said State, had escaped to the
State of Ohio, obtained a warrant from John L. Pendery, a Commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Ohio, directed to the marshal of said district, requiring
him to arrest said persons as fugitives from labor, and have them
before said Commissioner forthwith; in obedience to which warrant,
on the 80th of January the marshal made return that he had
arrested the said persons and had them before said Commissioner.
On the 9th of February, and while the investigation before the
Commissioner was pending, he issued his warrant to the marshal,
requiring him to commit the alleged fugitives to the jail of Hamilton county for safe keeping, to be produced from time to time, as
required; and they were duly committed to said jail in pursuance
of such warrant. On the 21st of February, on the petition of one
Jesse Beckley, alleging that said persons were unlawfully detained
in custody by the marshal of said district, a writ of habeas corpus
was issued by the judge of the Probate Court of Hamilton County;
requiring the marshal to have them before said judge forthwith,
with the cause of their caption and detention. On the 28th of
February, the Commissioner adjudged the said fugitives to be the
property of said Gaines, and ordered them to be delivered to him,
to be removed to the State of Kentucky. On the same day, the
said Gaines made his affidavit that he was apprehensive that said
fugitives would be rescued by force, and required that they should
be delivered to him in the State of Kentucky by the marshal, pursuant to provisions of the act of Congress. They were delivered to
the claimant by the marshal, according to said request.
On the 27th of February the marshal appeared before the judge
of the Probate Court of Hamilton County and submitted, by his
counsel, a motion to dismiss the writ of habeas co2 pus issued by
said judge, which motion was taken under advisement, and an order
was entered by the judge that the marshal should not remove the
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persons named in the writ from the jurisdiction of the court till the
final decision of the motion, which order was served on the marshal
on the 28th of February.
On the 1st of March a motion was again made to dismiss the writ
of habeas corpus, which was overruled by the Probate Judge, who
entered an order requiring the marshal to make a return to said
writ on the 7th of March. And on that day the marshal, protesting
against the jurisdiction of the Probate judge, made his return to the
writ of habeas corpus, in which he sets out the proceedings before
the Commissioner upon the claim of said Gaines, and avers that at
the time of the service of the writ of habeas corpus on him he held
the persons named in it in his custody, under the order of the Commissioner, as before noticed, by virtue of his office as marshal, and
by authority of laws and that on the said 27th of February, when
he appeared before the Probate judge and made his motion to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus, and when the order of that date was
made by said judge, as before stated, he held said persons in his
custody by virtue of his office as marshal, and by authority of law,
and that afterwards, upon the demand of said claimant, delivered
them to him in the State of Kentucky.
On the 8th of March the question as to the sufficiency of the
marshal's return was argued before the Probate judge, who continued
the same for advisement till the 18th of March; and on that day
decided that said return was insufficient, for the reasons that the
persons named in said writ of habeas corpus were not produced before him, and that the marshal, after the service of said writ, and
after the order that the persons named therein should not be removed
from the jurisdiction of the court, had removed them to the State of
Kentucky.
The probate judge, thereupon, adjudged the marshal guilty of a
contempt of court, and ordered that proceedings should be instituted against him for such contempt. And on the said 18th of March,
specifications were filed against the marshal, embodying the charges
for contempt. At the same time a rule was entered requiring the
marshal within two days from the service thereof, to show cause
why he should not be attached and punished for such contempt.
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This rule was served on the 15th inst., and on -the 17th he filed his
answer, setting forth that the acts complained of as a contempt of
said Probate Court were done or omitted in the discharge of his
duties as marshal of the United States for the Southern District of
Ohio, and in pursuance of the laws of the United States: and he
again denied the jurisdiction of said court to hold him accountable
for said acts. -To this answer, a replication was filed by the prosecuting attorney of Hamilton county, setting forth that the acts of
the marshal were not done or omitted in the discharge of his duties
as such officer, nor in pursuance of the laws of the United States.
On the same day, the probate judge decided the answer of the
marshal was insufficient, and adjudged him guilty of a contempt of
this court, and ordered that for such contempt he should be fined in
the sum of three hundred dollars and costs, and be committed to
the jail of Hamilton county. A commitment was immediately
issued by the Probate Court, and pursuant thereto the marshal was
seized and lodged in jail.
And on the same day, the marshal presented his petition to me,
setting forth under oath the facts connected with his imprisonment,
averring that he was unlawfully detained in custody, and praying
for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the sheriff of Hamilton
county. The writ was accordingly issued, and has been duly returned by the sheriff; and the marshal, by his counsel, now moves
for his discharge from custody.
The habeas corpus in this case issued pursuant to the seventh
section of the act of Congress, passed March 2d, 1833, which provides "that either of the justices of the Supreme Court or a judge
of any District Court of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of
habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, when he or they shall be committed or confined on or by
any authority of law, for any act done or omitted to be done in
pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process or
decree of any judge or court thereof, anything in any act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding."
It is insisted by the counsel who oppose the discharge of the
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marshal, that this provision of the act of Congress applies only to
the case of a federal officer who is confined or imprisoned 'by State
authority under an unconstitutional State law; and reference is
made to the historical fact, that the act of 1833 was passed to meet
the then existing exigency growing out of the threatened opposition of one of the States of the Union to the national legislation for
the imposition and collection of duties on imports. To this it may
be replied that, whatever may have been the peculiar circumstances
under which the act passed, the section above quoted is still in full
force, and obligatory as a law of the United States. And it may be
fairly inferred that while its purpose was at the date of its passage
to provide against a great danger then pending, it has been deemed
expedient that it should be continued as a remedy against nullification in any form in which it might be presented.
But this point is not now for the first time presented for decision.
It has been settled by eminent judges of the highest official position. In the case ez parte Jenkins, 2 Wallace, jr., 531, Judge
Grier of the Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ
of habeas corpus under the statute referred to, and released the
persons who applied for it -without the intimation of a doubt as to
the authority it conferred. And in the well-known Bosetta case,
-which occurred about a year since, Judge McLean granted a writ
of habeas corpus under the same provision of the statute, and
released the marshal from custody under circumstances very similar to those involved in the case now before me.
The only inquiry, therefore, arising in the present case is, whether,
from the facts proved, it sufficiently appears that the imprisonment
of the marshal was "for any act done or omitted to be done in
pursuance of a law of the United States." If this inquiry is answered affirmatively, it will follow that he is entitled to his discharge,
as the precise case contemplated by the statute in that event is
presented.
In the consideration of this question, it is not necessary to inquire
whether the probate judge could rightfully issue the writ of habeas
corpus; neither is it necessary that this court should assert or exercise a power of revising or reviewing the sentence of the probate
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judge for the indefinite imprisonment of the marshal for the alleged
contempt. Indeed, such a jurisdiction is distinctly disclaimed.
But if the conclusion is warranted, that the judgment against the
marshal was for an act done or omitted, in the discharge of official
duties, and under the authority of a law of the United States, an
obligation is imposed on me, from which I cannot shrink.
It has been before stated that the writ of h~abeas corpus from
the probate judge, issued the 21st of February, and that the decision of the commissioner, adjudging the fugitives to be the property
of the claimant, was made on the 26th of that month. Between
these dates the fugitives were in the custody of the marshal, under
the process of the commissioner, and it was undeniably his duty to
hold them, subject to the final action of the commissioner. Simultaneously with the decision on the claim of the owner, he made
oath, pursuant to the provisions of the ninth section of act of Congress, that he had good reason to apprehend a rescue of the fugitives. This section provides that when such oath is made, "it shall
be the duty of the officer making the arrest to retain such fugitive
in his custody, and to remove him to the State -whence he fled, and
there to deliver him to said claimant by his agent or attorney." It
is clear, from this provision, that the duty of keeping the fugitive
in custody, after the decision of the commissioner, if in favor of
the claimant, is as imperative as it is while he holds them under
the warrant or order of that officer.
With the obligation of this stringent and to him, paramount
law resting on him, was the marshal bound to obey the process'of
the probate judge ? It would seem there was no intention on the
part of the marshal to treat that judge with contemptuous disregard. He first appeared before him, and by his counsel exhibited
all the facts as to the apprehension, custody and disposition of the
fugitives, submitting at the same time a motion for the dismissal of
the writ of habeas corpus. This motion was overruled, and the
marshal was required to make a return to the writ. He then presented an answer, couched in respectful terms, stating the reasons
-why he could not produce the bodies of the fugitives. Was this in
contempt of the authority of the probate judge ? The marshal
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states in his answer, duly sworn to, that in his conduct he was
governed by what he regarded his duty under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. He was an officer appointed under the
Constitution, which he had sworn to support, and which declares
"that this Constitution and the laws of the United States, which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which
shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be
.the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding."
Now, if the marshal in good faith, and acting under what he
regarded as an imperative obligation resting on him by virtue of a
law of the United States, did or omitted to do the acts for which
he is-imprisoned by the sentence of the probate judge, is he not entitled to be discharged from imprisonment under the express provision of the act of Congress before referred to ?
In the Rbsetta case, before noticed, this same marshal refused
to obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by a State judge, commanding him to produce the alleged fugitive before him, on the ground
that such fugitive was in his custody under process from a commissioner of the United States Court; and for such refusal he was
arrested by a warrant issued by the judge as for a contempt. On
application to Judge McLean, that learned and distinguished judge
issued a iabeas corpus to bring the marshal before him, and, after
argument and full consideration, discharged him from the custody
of the State officer, under the act of Congress already quoted.
Judge McLean in his published opinion says: "The marshal
omitted to do the act ordered to be done by the Honorable Judge
Parker, because it would be in express violation of his duty under
an act of Congress. This is literally within the act." With the
knowledge of this adjudication, in a case involving the same principle as in the habeas corpus issued by the probate judge, is it
strange the marshal should have pursued the same course which
had received the sanction of the eminent judge referred to ? In
the case decided by Judge McLean the act omitted to be done was
the bringing of the alleged fugitive before Judge Parker under a,
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habeas corpus; and in the present case, it is the failure to produce
the fugitives named in the habeas corpus before the probate judge.
The same principle had been previously settled by the decision
of the learned judge before referred to, in the case of Norris vs.
Newton and others, 5 McLean, 92. He says, in the opinion of
the court in that case, "I have no hesitation in saying that the
judicial officers of a State under its own laws, in a case where an
unlawful imprisonment is shown by one or more affidavits, may issue
a writ of habeas corpus, and inquire into the cause of detention.
But this is a special and limited jurisdiction. If the plaintiff, in
the recaption of his fugitive slaves, had proceeded under the act of
Congress, and made proof of his claim before some judicial officer
of Michigan, and procured the certificate which authorized him to
take the fugitives to Kentucky, these facts being stated as the
cause of detention, would have terminated this jurisdiction of the
judge under the writ. Thus it would appear that the negroes were
held under the federal authority, which in this respect is paramount
to that of the State. The cause of detention being legal, no judge
could arrest and reverse the remedial proceedings of the master."
Judge McLean, adds, " And the return made by the plaintiff being
clearly within the provisions of the Constitution, as decided in the
case of ?rigg vs. Pennsylvania,and the facts of that return being
admitted by the counsel for the negroes, the judge could exercise
no further jurisdiction in the case. His power was at an end.
The fugitives were in the legal custody of their master, a custody
authorized by the Constitution, and sanctioned by the Supreme
Court of the Union." And again in the same case the learned
judge says: " The legal custody of the fugitives by the master being admitted, as stated in the return on the habeas corpus, every
step taken subsequently was against law and in violation of his
rights."
There is another high authority in support of the position that
in cases arising under an act of Congress the power of the federal
officers is paramount to that of the States. I refer to the charge
of Judge Nelson, of the Supreme Court of the United States, to
the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
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Southern District of New York, reported in the appendix to first
volume of Blatchford, 635. That learned judge, admitting the
right of a State judge to issue a habeas corpus for one in custody
under federal authority, adds that "when it is shown that the commitment or detainer is under the Constitution or a law of the United
States, or a treaty, the power of the State authority is at an end,
and any further proceedings under the writ is coram non Judice
and void. In such case, that is, when the prisoner is in fact held
under process issued from a federal tribunal under the Constitution,
or a law of the United Soates, or a treaty, it is the duty of the
officer not to give him up, or to allow him to pass from his bands in
any stage of the proceedings. He should stand upon his process
,and authority; and if resisted, maintain them with all the powers
,conferred upon him for that purpose."
Authorities of the same import could be greatly multiplied, but
it is unnecessary to adduce more. If judicial decisions are entitled
to any consideration, it is clearly established that, though it may
be competent for a State judge to issue the writ of habeas corpus
in a case of imprisonment under the authority of a law of the
United States, when the fact is made known to him, his jurisdictipn
ceases and all subsequent proceedings by him are void.
Is it supposable the marshal was ignorant that the law had been
thus settled by some of the ablest judges of the country, and was
he guilty of a wilful contempt in deferring to these high authorities?
He might well conclude that when the Probate judge became
apprised of the fact that the fugitives were in custody under a law
of the United States his jurisdiction ceased, and that the obligation
was imperative on him, under no circumstances to permit them to
be taken from his custody.
In the case of ez parte Jenkins, before referred to, Judge Grier
uses this language: "Neither can such fugitive, when in custody
of the marshal, under legal process from a judge or commissioner
of the United States, be delivered from such custody by means of a
htabeas corpus or any other process to answer for an offence against
the State, whether felony or misdemeanor, or for any other purpose."
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There is no doubt as to the result if the marshal had placed these
fugitives in the custody of the Probate judge, in obedience to the
writ of habeas corpus. The opinion of that judge, as published,
on the question of the sufficiency of the marshal's return, shows
clearly what his action would have been if the marshal had produced
the fugitives. In that opinion he held that the proceedings before
the commissioner, by which the fugitives were held in custody of
the marshal, were unconstitutional and void. Although it was
decided by Judge McLean, in the Rosetta case, that it was competent
for Congress to vest in commissioners appointed by the Circuit
Courts the powers conferred on them by the act of 1850, and that
they could, therefore, legally and constitutionally exercise those
powers, and although the same decision had been made by several
other judges of the Supreme Court, the Probate judge held otherwise, and that the acts of the commissioner were mere nullities;
and it would necessarily result from this decision that the process
by which the fugitives had been arrested was void, and that they
were illegally in the custody of the marshal. I do not refer to this
"with any purpose of arraigning the conduct or impeaching the
motives of the Probate judge, but in proof of the fact that obedience to this writ by the marshal would have resulted in the discharge of the fugitives.
In the Rosetta case, before referred to, the judge held that a
State court could not interfere -with the officers of the United States
in the performance of their duties, under the act of 1850, and that
although the fugitive in that case had been discharged by habeas
corpus, such discharge was no bar to the subsequent proceedings by
the commissioner.
As stated in a previous part of this opinion, I neither assert nor
exercise the jurisdiction to review or reverse the action of the Probate judge. The authorities to which I have referred have been
cited in support of the proposition that the law of the United States,
under which the marshal acted, was paramount in its obligation
upon him; and that, if that officer is now in custody for obedience
to that paramount law, the case is within the express terms of the
act of 1838, and he is entitled tp his discharge.
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The Passmore Williamson case, decided by the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania, and relied upon in the argument to prove that the
marshal ought not to be discharged on this application, did not
present the question arising in this case, and is not, therefore, an
authority in point. The facts in this case referred to were, that
Williamson had been-adjudged guilty of a contempt of the District
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
on an allegation that he had made a false return to a writ of habeas
corpus, directed to him by said court.

While in confinement, under

the judgment of the District Court, application was made to the
Supreme Court of the State for his discharge on a habeas corpus.
The ground on which the discharge was urged was, that the court
by which Williamson was committed had no jurisdiction, and, that
its sentence was, therefore, a nullity. The Supreme Court held
that on general principles they had no power to inquire into and
reverse the judgment of a court of another jurisdiction, and refused
to discharge the applicant. The case before me stands on wholly
different grounds, and does not raise the question decided by the
court in Pennsylvania. The interposition invoked in behalf of the
marshal is, by virtue of a statute of the United States, intended for
the express purpose of relieving the officials of the national government from imprisonment for the performance of duties enjoined on
them by law. As before remarked, it is solely under this statutory
provision that this court can take cognizance of this application,
and grant the discharge which is sought for.
In attempting to state briefly the conclusions to which I am
brought in the consideration of this case, I have not deemed it
necessary to notice all the views presented by the counsel resisting
the motion for the discharge of the marshal. One of them has
insisted, with much zeal and earnestness, that the fugitive slave
law, on which the proceedings in this case are based, is, in its most
essential requirements, unconstitutional and void, and cannot, therefore, form the basis of any valid action by any court or officer of
the government. I cannot take time to examine and refute this
position, but will suggest, what will be most obvious to those who
view the subject dispassionately, that a proper appreciation of my

